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Introduction
Concerns around access to children’s information animated the enactment of the
Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (“COPPA”).1 In 1998, a Federal Trade Commission
(“FTC”) report noted that the “nature” of children twelve and under made them vulnerable to
predatory marketing practices.2 At the time, 89% of children’s websites collected enough personal
information to create detailed profiles.3 The report suggested enacting legislation that regulated
the collection and use of children’s personal information, which included a parental consent
mechanism.4
This article proceeds as follows: Part 1 provides background on the “nature” of children’s
development with respect to the risks associated with their online behavior. Children’s ability to
understand these risks is outpaced by the technological developments that affords them ubiquitous
internet access. This access creates privacy concerns in the form of data-tracking, vulnerability to
Part II contextualizes COPPA’s enactment and

online harassment and other emerging threats.

provides an overview of the law, including the FTC’s authority to keep pace with technology
through notice and comment rulemaking. Part III reviews and updates criticism of COPPA as
ineffective legislation. It then highlights litigation and settlement trends, which demonstrate that
COPPA often acts as an obstacle to privacy protection. Part IV explains that the FTC’s
enforcement approach has little deterrent effect and can incentivize noncompliance, which
necessitates a shift in the FTC’s enforcement strategy. Specifically, the FTC may utilize its

Fed. Trade Comm’n, Privacy Online: A Report to Congress,4-5 (1998),
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/privacy -online-report-congress/priv-23a.pdf. The
Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998 is codified at 15 U.S.C. § 6501 et seq.
2 Fed. Trade Comm’n, Privacy Online: A Report to Congress, 4-5 (1998).
3 Id. at 31-32.
4 Id. at 42.
1
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rulemaking authority as granted by COPPA to impose greater privacy requirements and stiffer
penalties, the maximum amount per violation, to ensure compliance.
I.

CHILDREN’S INFORMATION PRIVACY: UNIQUE THREATS

The “nature” of children, the ubiquity of the internet, and evolving threats from new
technologies underscore the importance of protecting children’s privacy.5 Studies have shown that
children’s cognitive capacity for reasoning and media literacy increase between middle childhood
(ages 8-12) and adolescence, 6 as does their ability to conceptualize the risks associated with their
online behaviors.7 Children under eleven are especially vulnerable to the implicit risks of personal
data collection from mechanisms like data tracking, in app-recommendations, etc.8 A Pew
Research survey of teenagers’ (ages 12-17) social media use, including sharing habits, tracks with
these results.9 Pew’s comparison of teens’ social media sharing habits in 2006 to 2013 found
increases across all metrics: picture sharing, increased to 91% from 79%; school name, 71% from
49%; location data, 71% from 6%; email address 53% from 29%; and cellphone number, 20%
from 2%.10 The study authors explained these trends as reflective of changing social norms around
information sharing.11 Children’s developing abilities to conceptualize risk and permissive social

Campaign for a Commercial Free Childhood, Comment on the Implementation of the Children’s Online Privacy
Protection Rule,1-9 (Dec. 11,2019), https://commercialfreechildhood.org/wp -content/uploads/2019/12/CCFCCOPPA-comments.pdf.
6 Courtney K. Blackwell et al., Children and the Internet: Developmental Implications of Web Site Preferen ces
Among 8- to12-Year-Old Children, Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media, 58:1,1(Feb. 28,
2014),http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/08838151.2013.875022.
7
Jun Zhao et al., “I Make Up A Silly Name’”: Understanding Children's Perception of Privacy Risks Online in CHI
19: Proc. of the 2019 CHI Conf. on Hum. Factors in Computing Sys. 1, 3 (2019),
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1901.10245.pdf.
8 Id.
9 Mary Madden, et al.,Pew Research Center, Teens, Social Media, and Privacy, (May 21,2013),
https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2013/05/21/teens-social-media-and-privacy/.
10 Id.
11 Id.
5
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attitudes towards information sharing signal the importance of regulating access to children’s
personal information.
Children are developing in a time of increasing connectivity.12 The National Center for
Education Statistics reported that 94% of children three to eighteen accessed the internet at home
in 2018.13 Eighty-eight percent of the sample accessed the internet through a home computer,
while 6% only used smart phones.14 However, access to the internet through smart mobile devices
is growing; 98% of American children under eight had access to a mobile device at home, an
increase from just over 50% in 2011.15 Approximately one in five eight year-olds, 53% of children
aged 11, 69% of children aged 12,16 and 95% of teenagers own or have access to smartphones.17
Children live in an time of unprecedented access to the internet, which means that their personal
lives are generating data that is collected and utilized with or without their knowledge.
Children’s educational lives are

also subject to data-tracking through digital learning

technologies.18 One third of all K-12 students in U.S. schools use connected devices.19 Eighty-six
percent of high school students use laptops and 50% of elementary school students use tablets
during the school year.20 Moreover, the adaption noneducational technology into educational

12

Victoria Rideout & Michael B. Robb, Common Sense Media, The Commonsense Census: Media Use by Tweens
and Teens, 1, 3 (2019) https://www.commonsensemedia.org/sites/default/files/uploads/research/2019 -census-8-to18-full-report-updated.pdf.
13 Nat’l Ctr. for Educ. Stat. Table 702.12, (Nov. 2020),
https://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d20/tables/dt20_702.12.asp.
14 Id.
15 Campaign for a Commercial Free Childhood, supra note 5 at 2.
16 Id. at 5.
17 Commonsense Census, supra note 12, at 27.
18 Frida Alim et al., Elec. Frontier Found., Spying on Students: School-Issued Devices and Student Privacy, 5
(2017), https://www.eff.org/wp/school-issued-devices-and-student-privacy.
19 Id.
20 Harris Poll, Pearson Student Mobile Device Survey 2014 National Report: Students in Grades 4-12,34 (May 9,
2014), https://www.pearsoned.com/wp-content/uploads/Pearson-K12-Student-Mobile-Device-Survey-050914PUBLIC-Report.pdf.
4

contexts presents additional risks to children’s privacy. 21 The Covid-19 pandemic highlights the
ubiquity of conference applications and platforms adapted for online learning, such as Zoom.22
Zoom permits its administrators to view detailed user activity information, essentially tracking
their behavior and location.23 Zoom administrators may also access the content of recorded calls,
join calls, and enjoy carte blanche permission to listen. 24 Children’s use of connected devices
generates data about all aspects of their lives and raises privacy concerns about the entities granting
access and profiting from their online activities.
Threats to children’s privacy illustrate one of COPPA’s weaknesses: it regulates data children
send, while neglecting other legitimate privacy threats. 25 Evolving threats, like those arising from
artificial intelligence (“AI”), involve both information sent and received. AI is a subfield of
computer science concerned with developing software that derives patterns in data through a
combination of large data sets and intelligent programing. 26 AI runs toys that children use while
away from the screen.27 Connected toys running AI software present privacy risks because they
collect personal information including voice and behavior patterns, and are a target for hackers.28
Further complicating the matter, unconscious bias programmed into AI may shape end-users’
experiences.29 Some AI based machine learning tools affiliate the words ‘female’ and ‘woman’
with arts and humanities occupations and with homemaking and correlate ‘male’ and ‘man ‘with

21

Lindsay Oliver, Elec. Frontier Found, What You Should Know About Online Tools During the COVID-19 Crisis
(Jan. 3, 2021), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2020/03/what-you-should-know-about-online-tools-during-covid-19crisis.
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 Stephen Beemrsterboer, COPPA Killed the Video Star: How the Youtube Settlement Shows that COPPA Does
More Harm than Good, 25 Ill. Bus. L.J. 63, 75 (2020).
26 SAS Institute, Artificial Intelligence –What It Is and Why It Matters, (2021),
https://www.sas.com/en_us/insights/analytics/what-is-artificial-intelligence.html.
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 Id.
5

math and engineering professions, which skews the content or opportunities provided to users.30
Despite these risks, the demand for AI embedded virtual learning platforms remains high due to
their efficiency and cost-effectiveness.31 Demand for AI driven education products is likely to
surpass six billion dollars by 2024 due to educational institutions’ interest in personalized learning
or enhanced educational experiences.32 AI embedded products present non-traditional threats to
children’s privacy, while legitimate privacy related threats, like bullying, can be aided by
technology. A Pew study reported that teens of both genders are equally likely to be bullied online;
however, teenage girls are more likely to be the subject of false rumors, receive nonconsensual
explicit images, and receive multiple forms of online harassment.33 One especially pernicious
form of harassment that disproportionally effects girls is known as Deep Fakes.34 Deep Fakes
utilize AI to transpose pictures, videos, and voice recordings of girls into pornographic scenes.35
Threats to children’s privacy involve data that is sent and received; while, some data-transmissions
are more invasive than others, COPPA remains focused on data-collection from children.

30

Hannah Devlin, AI Programs Exhibit Racial and Gender Biases, Research Reveals, Guardian (Apr. 13,
2017), http://www.theguardian.com/ technology/2017/apr/13/ai-programs-exhibit-racist-and-sexist-biases-researchreveals. Devlin’s article cites to an academic paper published in Science: Aylin Caliskan et
al., Semantics Derived Automatically from Language Corpora Contain Human-like Biases, 356 Sci.,183 (2017).
31
Bora Ronak, Artificial Intelligence in Education Market in APAC to Register a Phenomenal CAGR of 51% Over
2018-2024. Fractovia Market Trending News, (April 08, 2019), https://www.fractovia.org/news/artificialintelligence-in-education-market-share-trend/1984.
32 Id.
33 Monica Anderson, Pew Research Ctr., A Majority of Teens Have Experienced Some Form of Cyberbullying (Sept.
27, 2018), https://www.pewinternet.org/2018/09/27/a-majority-of-teens-have-experienced-some-form-ofcyberbullying/.
34 Bobby Chesney & Danielle Citron, Deep Fakes: A Looming Challenge for Privacy, Democracy, and National
Security, 107 Calif. L. Rev. 1753, 1772-73 (Dec. 2019).
35 Id.
6

II.

COPPA OVERVIEW

Congress passed the “Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998” in response to
concerns over the dissemination of children’s personal information over the internet. 36 In 1998,
the FTC reported the results of their survey of commercial websites, including those targeting
children.37

Eighty-nine percent of the sampled children’s websites collected personal

information.38 Of the sampled websites, 1% required consent for the collection and use of
information, 8% provided parental notification of their information collection practices, and 23%
required parental consent before granting children access. 39 These practices were concerning due
to the “particular vulnerability” of children and the ease of circumventing parents to collect their
information.40 The FTC recognized parental involvement as “fundamental” to the protection of
children’s privacy and the implementation of fair data collection practices. 41 The report
recommended congressional legislation that increased parental control over their children’s
internet access.42
The Commission originally proposed legislation requiring prior parental consent and an
opt-in for parents of children twelve and under, and prior parental notice and the choice to opt out
for parents of children thirteen and up. 43 After some debate, Congress enacted the Children’s
Online Privacy Protection Act, “COPPA,” which requires websites to adopt policies that protect

36

Privacy Online, supra note 1.
Id.
38 Id. at 31.
39 Id.
40 Id. at 4-5.
41 Id.
42 Id. at 42-43.
43 Julie Jargon, How 13 Became the Internet's Age of Adulthood, Wall St. J. (June 18,
2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-13-became-the-internets-age-of-adulthood-11560850201.
37
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children’s privacy and requires parental consent from websites and services targeting children.44
COPPA regulates websites and online services that are “directed to children” or whose operators
have “actual knowledge” of child users.45 Factors in the “child-directed” determination include
subject matter, visual content, use of child oriented activities etc.46 COPPA also regulates websites
whose operator’s possess “actual knowledge” that their sites are “collecting personal information
directly from users of another website or online service.”47 However, COPPA concerns itself with
privacy in name only, as it defines privacy as compliant data collection from children.
COPPA compliant data collection requires “verifiable parental consent” in a form
appropriate to the intended use of the information. 48

The manner of the consent must be

“reasonably calculated” to ensure that the grantor is the child’s parent, e.g. written authorizations,
credit card transactions, or calls to toll free numbers.49 Operators may retain children’s personal
information so long as is “reasonably necessary” to fulfill the collection’s purpose and then take
reasonable measures when deleting it.50 COPPA grants the FTC enforcement authority, with other
federal

agencies

retaining

authority

over

the

entities

that

they

oversee.51 State attorneys general (“AGs”) may bring parens patriae actions provided they give
the FTC notice.52 Remedies include civil penalties or injunctions focused on remediating past
violations.53 The FTC considers a number of factors like egregiousness of the violation, previous

Children's Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998, 15 U.S.C.§§6501 -6506; Children’s Online Privacy Protection
Rule, 16 C.F.R. §§312 (Jan. 17, 2013); Final Rule 78 Fed. Reg, 3971,3977 -78 (Jan.17.2013).
45 15 U.S.C. § 6501.9; 16 C.F.R. §§ 312.3.
46 Fed. Trade Comm'n, Complying with COPPA: Frequently Asked Questions (March 23,
2021), https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/business-center/guidance/complying-coppa -frequently-asked-questions.
47 16 C.F.R. § 312.2
48 Id. at § 312.5.
49 Complying with COPPA, supra note 46.
50 16 CFR § 312.10.
51
15 U.S.C. §§ 6505(a), (c), & (d).
52 Id. at § 6504(a)(2).
53 Id. at § 6504(a)(1).
44
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violations, and number of children when imposing penalties. 54 Parents of children whose
information was collected may review all collected personal information, request its deletion, and
prevent further collection from that operator.55 The COPPA safe harbor, a self-regulatory
provision, permits developers of children’s apps or web-sites to submit their products for a
compliance review by a designated organization. 56 Safe harbor approval requires the same or
greater protections for children and results in comparatively lenient enforcement penalties for
violations.57 COPPA preempts “inconsistent” state law claims and lacks a private right of action
or personal remedies.58 To date, despite sweeping changes in technology, the statutory protections
offered and entitlement to bring claims, remain unaltered .59
The FTC deals with the threats to children’s privacy based on rapidly evolving
technology through its rulemaking authority.60 The FTC engaged in notice and comment
rulemaking to expand the definition of “personal information.”61 The revised definition
includes persistent identifiers as well as “screen names, geolocation, photos, videos, and audio
recordings” that “can be used to recognize a user over time and across different websites or
online services.”62 The revised definition of “operator” now covers websites that use outside
services, e.g. plug-ins and ad-networks, that collect personal information. 63 The rule carved
out an exception for “support for the internal operations" for third party services that gather

54

Complying with COPPA, supra note 46.
16 C.F.R. § 312.4.
56 Id at § 312.11(a)&(b).
57 Id. at § 312.11(g).
58 §6502(d).
59 15 U.S.C. § 6501 et seq.
60 Ariel Fox Johnson, 13 Going on 30: An Exploration of Expanding COPPA's Privacy Protections to Everyone, 44
Seton Hall Legis. J. 419, 428 (2020).
61 Fed. Trade Comm'n, FTC Seeks Comment on Children's Online Privacy Protections: Questions Whether Changes
to Technology Warrant Changes to Agency Rule (Mar. 24, 2010),https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/pressreleases/2010/03/ftc-seeks-comment-childrens-online-privacy-protections-questions.
62 16 CFR § 312.2; 78 FR 3972, 3973.
63 Id.
55
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persistent identifiers, provided no personal information is associated with the gathering, and the
information is not used to generate a data profile of the user. 64 These changes address the
evolving threats to children’s privacy from ad-networks that trace children’s internet use and
mobile devices with location tracking, as well as social media companies who facilitate
children’s information sharing.65
III. COPPA CRITICISM & ENFORCEMENT
A. COPPA: UNDERSTANDING DATA COLLECTION AS PRIVACY
Shortly after its enactment, Professor Anita L. Allen analyzed COPPA from the vantages of
privacy and family law in her article Minor Distractions: Children, Privacy, and E-Commerce.66
Her analysis of COPPA’s effectiveness considered whether: (1) websites and operators complied
with COPPA’s requirements; (2) parents engaged in adequate supervision of their children; and
(3) it was effective from a family law standpoint. 67
Allen observed that sporadic industry compliance suggested a partial failure of COPPA.68
This partial compliance was confirmed by an independent study completed at the time, as well as
a later FTC compliance survey.69 However, partial compliance is equally as reflective of the FTC’s
enforcement strategy as with problems in the legislation. To date the FTC has brought thirty-three
enforcement actions under COPPA since 1998, the year of its enactment.70 This number of
enforcement actions is representative of the selectivity of the FTC in bringing claims, as opposed

64

Id.
Id.
66 Anita L. Allen, Minor Distractions: Children, Privacy, and E-Commerce, 38 Houston L. Rev. 751,761 (2001).
67 Id.
68 Id. at 767- 68.
69 Id. at 768; Fed. Trade Comm'n, Protecting Children's Privacy Under COPPA: A Survey on Compliance, 1-2
(2002), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/rules/children%E2%80%99s-online-privacy-protectionrule-coppa/coppasurvey.pdf.
70 Cases Tagged with Children's Online Privacy Protection Act , https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/casesproceedings/terms/336 (follow “case proceedings” hyperlink)(last accessed March 10, 2021).
65
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to indicative of industry compliance. The FTC promised to conduct sweeps of offending websites
in 2019.71 This promise was echoed by the FTC’s 2020 enforcement priorities, which expressly
included COPPA.72 Widespread compliance has yet to be achieved; however, that suggests that
the FTC may need to reconsider its enforcement strategy. 73
Allen’s inquiry into parents’ capacity to adequately monitor their children's online behavior
demonstrates many of the problems with the law.74 Parental responses to requests for “verifiable
consent” may fall between a “close supervision” or “unfettered access” approach.75 The close
supervision approach provides some access to internet content, but frustrates some independent
exploration because of its reliance on an available parent. 76 The unfettered access approach
supports exploration, but results in more possible visits to inappropriate sites.77 Both of these
approaches reflect two of COPPA’s presumptions regarding family behavior: (1) that parents will
be available while children are online; and (2) that children will seek consent before seeking
access.78

Assuming its availability, parental consent may not go far enough to protect children’s

personal information. Studies that show 91% of Americans accept legal terms of service without
reading them.79 Moreover, parental consent may be granted on considerations other than children’s
privacy, e.g. because the website is associated with a family-friendly brand like Disney, Barbie,

71

Allison Fitzpatrick, FTC Settlement Over COPPA Will Change YouTube's Biz Model, Law 360 (September 19,
2019).
72 Lesley Fair, FTC Consumer Protection Year in Review Offers 2020 Vision for Your Business, Fed. Trade.
Comm’n (Jan. 8, 2020), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/blogs/business-blog/2020/01/ftc-consumer-protectionyear-review-offers-2020-vision-your
74 Allen,sSupra note 66, at 769.
75 Id. at 768-769.
76 Id.
77 Id.
78 15 U.S.C. § 6501.9.
79 Deloitte, 2017 Global Mobile Consumer Survey: US Edition, at 12 (2017),
https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/us/Documents/technology -media -telecommunications/us-tmt-2017global-mobile-consumer-survey-executive-summary.pdf.
11

etc.80 While some children seek parental consent, age falsification is prevalent. 81 A Pew study
found 39% of online teens admitted to falsifying their age to access Facebook age restricted
websites, for example.82 While COPPA assumes widespread parental compliance, studies have
shown that some parents knowingly help their underage children create Facebook accounts, which
circumvents COPPA’s requirements.83 These assumptions demonstrate that COPPA over-trusts
parents as gatekeepers to children’s data.
From a family law standpoint, according to Prof. Allen, COPPA’s distinction between
teenagers and adolescents or “tweenagers” is “dubious.”84 Younger children can easily circumvent
the statue’s requirements by falsifying their age, and children of all ages require varying levels of
parental supervision.85 The distinction between the two age groups is noteworthy for its insight
into how COPPA defines privacy. Instead of offering incremental privacy protections reflective of
children’s increasing ability to conceptualize the risks of online information sharing, it regulates
data collection from a monolithic group it defines as children.86 Allen explained that COPPA’s
imposition of parental consent could be understood as authoritarian and based on the paternalistic
assumption that children lack the judgment necessary to make safe disclosures of personal
information.87 However, this assumption is supported by psychological studies, which affirm that

80

Allen, supra note 66, at 769.
Madden, supra note 9.
82 Id.
83 Danah Boyd et al., Why parents help their children lie to Facebook about age: Unintended consequences of the
'Children's Online Privacy Protection Act', 16 FIRST MONDAY 11
(2011), https://journals.uic.edu/ojs/index.php/fm/article/download/3850/3075 [https://perma.cc/6T2X-BVZM]This
is far from a harmless practice because the fake account’s real friends provide enough personal information for
hackers to pinpoint their locations and create detailed profiles. NYU Tandon School of Engineering, Online Privacy
Laws Put Children at Greater Risk of Predators, Phishing, (Nov. 30 2012),
,https://engineering.nyu.edu/news/online-privacy-laws-put-children-greater-risk-predators-phishing.
84 Allen, supra note 66, at 777
85 Id.
86 15 U.S.C. §6501(1).
87 Allen, supra note 66, at 772.
81
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children incrementally develop the ability to conceptualize the long and short term risks associated
with online information sharing.88 Recently, members of Congress have sought to address the age
requirement

in a proposed amendment to COPPA.89 The Preventing Real Online Threats

Endangering Children Today (“Protect Kids Act”) proposes to extend COPPA’s scope to include
children sixteen and under.90 Whether the age cut-off remains at thirteen or is raised to sixteen,
COPPA’s theme that the parent will protect the child is consistent with historic Constitutional Law
assumptions. Imposing parental decision making between children and internet access aligns with
the central presumption of family law that a fit parent acts in the best interest of their child .91 The
Court has long held that children and adults do not share the same privacy rights because of
children’s lack of maturity.92 The court has vested decision making with parents as guardians of
their children’s well-being. Therefore, even if paternalistic, COPPA reflects existing legal
standards about parent’s obligations to protect children’s privacy.
B. COPPA ENFORCEMENT: CHILDREN PAY THE PRICE
COPPA forces potential litigants to navigate both state and federal law in the face of wellresourced defendants. COPPA’s omits a private right of action as a remedy and delegates
enforcement power to the FTC and state attorneys general. 93 “Inconsistent” state laws are
preempted under COPPA, which limits recourse to state tort laws when available. 94

88

Zhao, supra note 7, at 3.
Preventing Real Online Threats Endangering Children Today, H.R. 5573, 116th Congress (2020).
90 Id.
91 Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 68 (2000) (explaining that family law “rests on a presumption that parents
possess what a child lacks in maturity, experience, and capacity for judgment required for making life's difficult
decisions.”).
92 Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634 (1979) (explaining that the constitutional rights of children cannot be equated
with those of adults because of the peculiar vulnerability of children, their inability to make decisions in an
informed and, mature manner, and the importance of the parent role in child rearing).
93 15 U.S.C. §§ 6505(a), (c), & (d); 6504(a).
94 15 U.S.C. 6502(d) (“No State or local government may impose any liability for commercial activities or actions
by operators in interstate or foreign commerce in connection with an activity or action described in this chapter that
89
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Plaintiffs who might seek enforcement of child privacy claims under state law are often
precluded from doing so. For example, in Hubbard the plaintiffs’ state law claims alleged that
Google’s data practices unjustly enriched the company and violated their children’s privacy
rights.95 Google collected data from their children to develop data profiles that increased user time
on their YouTube platform.96 This practice drove revenue increases from targeted advertising,
which allegedly unjustly enriched the defendant and intruded upon the plaintiffs’ privacy.97 The
Northern District of California declined to apply the presumption against preemption.98 It held
that state law claims premised on COPPA violations were preempted because Congress delegated
COPPA enforcement to the FTC without providing a private right of action.99 In Manigualt the
Fourth Circuit did not reach the preemption claim, but found plaintiffs’ allegations regarding
Google’s data-collection practices insufficient to state an intrusion upon seclusion claim.100 The
plaintiffs failed to establish a reasonable expectation of privacy in their mobile devices and did not
allege facts showing a “substantial and unreasonable intrusion occurred in manner ‘highly
offensive’ to a reasonable person.”101 The court also noted that their failure to allege facts of any
actual harm or injury suffered due to the intrusion. 102

is inconsistent with the treatment of those activities or actions under this section.”). But see In re: Nickelodeon
Consumer Priv. Litig., 827 F.3d 262, 291-93 (3d Cir.2016) (holding that there is a general presumption against
preemption of state claims, especially if the state claims are not truly inconsistent .).
95 Hubbard v. Google LLC, --- F. Supp. 3d --- (N.D. Cal. 2020), 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 239936, *4.
96 Id. at *7-8.
97 Id.
98 Id. at *25.
99 Id. The Hubbard court’s holding tracks with the Supreme Court’s current position against applying the
presumption against preemption in express preemption cases. See, Jay B. Sykes & Nicole Vanatko, Cong. Rsch.
Serv., R45825, Federal Preemption: A Legal Primer,4 (2019), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R45825.pdf.
100 Manigault-Johnson v. Google, Ltd. Liab. Co., Civil Action No. 2:18-cv-1032-BHH, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
59892 (D.S.C. Mar. 31, 2019) at *6. An intrusion upon seclusion claim generally requires a sh owing “that the
defendant ‘intentionally intrude[d] into a place, conversation, or matter as to which the plaintiff has a reasonable
expectation of privacy’; that the intrusion ‘occur[red] in a manner highly offensive to a reasonable person’; and that
the intrusion harmed the plaintiff. Hernandez v. Hillsides, Inc., 211 P.3d 1063, 1072 (Cal. 2009).” Manigault, *4
at n.3.
101 Id. at *18.
102 Id.
14

However other courts take a broader view of privacy expectations as they relate to
technology. For example, the Third Circuit found that plaintiffs’ intrusion upon seclusion claim
was not preempted by COPPA in the matter of Nickelodeon Consumer Privacy Litigation.103 In
that case, the plaintiffs’ intrusion claim survived because COPPA does not regulate deceptive data
collection practices.104 Defendants Google and Viacom’s websites promised not to collect
children’s personal information, but collected it regardless.105 In so doing, the defendants created
“a false expectation of privacy and obtained personal information under false pretenses."106 The
Third Circuit, applying a presumption against preemption, held that COPPA leaves the states free
to regulate deceptive conduct. 107
Some courts have found that the imposition of liability for state law claims does not conflict
with Congress’ intent to regulate data collection from children. 108 New Mexico, acting in its parens
patriae capacity, alleged that Google Ad Networks’ collection of persistent identifiers to track
users was highly offensive to a reasonable person. 109 Tiny Labs developed apps that utilized
cookies to collect user data and serve them targeted advertising.110 The developer submitted these
gaming apps to Google’s Designed for Families Program, which focused on child friendly apps,
and reviewed them twice to determine if they were child directed. 111 Google thus acquired “actual
knowledge” of the child directed apps.112 The appeals court held the “actual knowledge” element

103

In re Nickelodeon Consumer Priv. Litig., 827 F.3d 262, 291-93 (3d Cir. 2016) cert. denied sub nom C.A.F. v.
Viacom, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 624 (2017).
104 Id.
105 Id. at 267.
106 Id. at 292.
107 Id. at 267
108 N.M. ex rel. Balderas v. Tiny Lab Prods., 457 F. Supp. 3d 1103, 1121 (D.N.M. 2020).
109 Id. at 1123-24.
110 Id at 1127.
111 Id. at 1117.
112 Id.
15

was satisfied, which meant that the COPPA claim could proceed; as such, there was no grounds to
preempt the intrusion claim.113
Relief under state tort law is fact sensitive and turns on jurisdictional approaches to
preemption. Some circuits require private litigants to allege tort violations for conduct outside of
COPPA’s ambit to survive preemption;114 while others permit tort claims on the basis of conduct
regulated by COPPA to proceed to trial. 115 The presumption against preemption permits state law
claims based on conduct outside of COPPA to proceed.116 However, litigants must allege evidence
beyond non-compliant data collection to find relief under state tort laws with high evidentiary
thresholds.117 Whether “verifiable parental consent” is viable as a defense under these
circumstances remains an open question. While consent to illegal conduct is not valid, consent is
an affirmative defense against an intrusion being unreasonable.118

More often, companies can

rely on COPPA’s express delegation of enforcement power to the FTC to preempt private
actions.119
The settlement process begins when the FTC files authorized complaints based on “reason
to believe” that a COPPA violation exists that affects the public. 120 Defendants routinely sign
consent decrees that do not constitute an admission of guilt but operate with the force of law when
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signed by a district court judge.121 In exchange, the FTC routinely assesses either civil penalties or
injunctive relief in the form of remedial conduct. 122
Shortly after its enactment, three companies violated COPPA in 2001. 123 Monarch Services
Inc., Girls Life Inc., and LookSmart Ltd. collected personal information from children signing up
for their services without obtaining verifiable parental consent.124 The websites posted no privacy
policies that either required parental consent or complied with COPPA. 125 The FTC imposed a
combined civil penalty totaling $100,000 on the three companies, the largest civil penalties until
that date, and enjoined them to delete all data collected in violation of COPPA from the date of
its enactment.126 Two years later, the FTC settled complaints against Hershey Foods Corporation
and Mrs. Fields Cookies for the largest civil penalties up until that date. 127 Both companies
collected children’s personal information without obtaining verifiable parental consent.128
Notably, Hershey was the FTC’s first challenge to a company’s method of obtaining consent.129
Hershey provided an online consent form, but failed to ensure that parents saw or filled it out. 130
The FTC imposed civil penalties of $85,000.00 on Hershey’s and $100,000.00 on Mrs. Fields;
neither company admitted to any wrongdoing and were enjoined to delete all noncompliant
data.131
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The FTC brought its first COPPA case against a mobile application that specifically targeted
children in 2011.132 W3 Innovations violated COPPA by collecting children’s email addresses
and permitting them to post personal information on message boards without prior verifiable
parental consent.133 W3 was assessed $50,000 in civil penalties and was enjoined to delete all the
information that their apps collected within five days of the entry of the consent orders.134 More
recently, the FTC brought its first case against developers of stalking apps in 2019 against RetinaX Studios and its founder.135 The app, installed without the user’s consent or knowledge,
monitored their mobile devices.136 However, purchasers first had to bypass device manufacturer
restrictions, which compromised device security.137 Further security complications arose from the
hack of the company handling Retina-x’s data-management needs.138 The defendants settled
without paying any civil penalties. They were enjoined to remediate their oversight and security
practices, and delete noncompliant data within 120 days of the order’s entry. 139
In 2019, the FTC announced a settlement with the operators of the social networking app
Musical.ly for COPPA violations.140 Musical.ly allegedly collected children’s personal information
including email addresses, and video.141 The default settings of the app permitted adults to direct
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message children with private accounts and locate users within a 50 mile radius. 142 The FTC
imposed the largest civil penalty to that date of $5.7 million, enjoined the removal of all non
compliant videos of children, and required full compliance with COPPA going forward.143 In
September of 2019, the FTC and the New York Attorney General’s office settled with the first
general audience website.144 YouTube used persistent identifiers to track children’s internet
usage.145 This collection of persistent identifiers triggered the requirement for “verifiable parental
consent.”146 Youtube’s argument that it was not child-directed failed because the presence of child
directed channels and videos, and marketing as a popular destination for children, satisfied the
“actual knowledge” requirement.147 While the settlement imposed the largest civil penalty to date,
$170 million ($136 million to the FTC and $34 million to New York), it did not require Google or
YouTube to delete any of the collected information, did not compel immediate cessation of the
non-compliant activity, or enjoin YouTube to develop mechanisms to ensure that channel owners
complied with COPPA.148 In so doing, the FTC placed the burden of compliance on individual
channel owners, who can be sued, while YouTube was required to maintain a system that labeled
child-directed videos.149 The FTC similarly alleged that HyperBeard, developer of children’s
apps including Kleptocats, KleptoCats 2, KleptoDogs, etc. violated COPPA by permitting thirdparty ad networks to collect persistent identifiers to track app users, without first obtaining
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verifiable parental consent.150 The ad networks used the identifiers to target ads to children using
HyperBeard’s apps.151 The $4 million settlement was suspended upon payment of $150,000. 152
Children bear the cost of the FTC’s enforcement strategy. While COPPA’s rulemaking power
allows FTC to respond to current trends or emerging issues, the concentration of enforcement
power in the FTC is at the root of many of COPPA’s shortcomings. There is no private right of
action, which means that the FTC chooses the suits to bring and can settle for amounts that might
not have substantial deterrent effect.

Furthermore, COPPA’s preemption provision denies

accompanying torts, which might provide financial relief to children or class actions of children
that could make a more substantial impact.
IV.

COPPA SETTLMENTS SETTLE FOR LESS

A. THE FTC’S APPROACH TO COPPA ENFORCEMENT IS INSUFFICIENT
While children’s privacy intrusions are seemingly ongoing, settlements likely have little
deterrent effect. For example, the record setting YouTube penalty of $170 million is approximately
.01% of Youtube’s advertising revenue, $15.149 billion dollars.153 The penalty amounts to .001%
of Alphabet’s (Google and Youtube’s parent company) total revenue of $161.857 billion dollars.154
The settlement amount seems insufficient in light of Alphabet’s overall financial resources 155 and
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the value derived from the noncompliant data collection. 156 When the penalty amount is divided
by the maximum penalty of $42,350 per single violation, it accounts for noncompliant collection
from 4,014 children.157 This is likely well under the amount of website traffic from children when
its ad revenue is used as a general indicator. 158 The revenues from behavioral advertisements led
Commissioner Rohit Chopra to conclude that Google profited from noncompliance because their
gains from violations exceeded the civil penalty they paid.159 He observed that a settlement amount
is not a penalty when the offending company pays a fine and profits from its misconduct.160
Moreover, other considerations make the penalty amount insufficient. For example, the penalty
did not take into account the increased value to Google’s algorithms generated by the
noncompliant data.161 The settlement’s injunctive relief was similarly insufficient because it did
not require YouTube to create an enforcement mechanism to police the honesty of non-child
directed content creators.162 Without such an enforcement mechanism, unscrupulous content
creators would weigh the likelihood of a COPPA enforcement action against potential profits and
disregard the warning the steep fine was meant to send. 163 In those circumstances, YouTube could
use the dishonest designations as evidence that it did not have “actual knowledge” of child directed content .164
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COPPA’s narrow delegation of enforcement authority to the FTC hinders rather than
protects children’s privacy. Dissenting opinions discussing the concept of harm illustrate an
institutional perspective that favors industry over children’s privacy. 165

In HyperBeard, a

dissenting commissioner opposed the civil penalty because the apps’ violative collection of
persistent identifiers resulted in minimal harms to children.166

Similarly,

a commissioner

dissenting from the YouTube settlement explained low-opening settlement bids as resulting from
resource constraints as well as an institutional hesitancy to litigate.167 It bears noting that the FTC
attempted to regulate advertisements targeting children in the late 1970s based on public policy
considerations.168 In response, Congress restricted the FTC’s authority to promulgate rules for
advertisements targeting children,169 and would not reauthorize the FTC from 1980 to 1994.170
The FTC’s institutional history operates in the backdrop of decisions to settle as opposed to litigate,
generally.171 In the COPPA context, FTC commissioners prefer settlements because of the high
risk of litigation.172 As it stands, the FTC is an agency with limited resources and competing
priorities that prefers settlements to litigation.173 However, whether a private right of action could
provide greater relief to children and more powerful sanctions to offenders is an open question.174
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B. A PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION WITHOUT MORE IS INSUFFICIENT

A commonly proposed fix to COPPA is a private right of action. However, permitting
individuals to bring COPPA claims may not work as intended ; a previous privacy related FTC
enforcement action is illustrative in this regard. The FTC alleged Trans Union violated the Fair
Credit Reporting Act by engaging in targeted marketing, however, the court denied class
certification because of the “catastrophic” effect of granting statutory damages of $100-$1,000
per violation of the 190 million member class.175 COPPA sets a maximum for civil penalties but
no minimum, which may mean that a putative class may not face the same difficulties as in
Trans Union.176 Moreover, the FTC selects the offenders it prosecutes, which implies the
existence of unprosecuted violations and violators as well as plaintiffs who remain similarly
unaware. The resulting paucity of enforcement actions – thirty-three since 1998– may be another
reason to grant a private right of action.177 However, opening enforcement to private litigants
requires a substantive overhaul of the COPPA for a number of reasons.
Consent is a viable defense especially in intrusion upon seclusion claims.178 Whether
parental consent vitiates any intrusion claim is an open question. However, to reach that
question, a plaintiff must allege sufficient facts including damages to obtain relief under the
common law tort of intrusion upon seclusion.179 Even then obstacles to relief remain, notably
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Congress’ express intent to preempt state laws that are “inconsistent” with COPPA.180 The
Supreme Court, departing from earlier precedent, no longer applies a presumption against
preemption where state laws are inconsistent with federal laws. 181 A private cause of action,
without limitations on consent as a defense and the removal of the preemption provision would
offer little relief to potential litigants.182 The Protect Kids Act makes no mention of personal
remedies, but codifies many of the Rule’s existing protections and proposes to expand the
definition of children.183 However, increasing the age cutoff to sixteen would expand the
enforcement authority of an agency with limited resources, competing priorities and a hesitance
to enforce privacy law.
C. ORGANIC SOLUTIONS
This article proposes a two-pronged solution to protect children’s privacy under a datacollection regulation enforced primarily by settlements. The FTC should increase the threshold
compliance requirements by incorporating privacy by design through notice and comment
rulemaking. The privacy by design approach requires companies to proactively consider privacy
issues at every stage of product development by their entire workforce. 184 This approach limits
data collection to the information essential to complete a transaction and requires its deletion at
the conclusion of the transaction.185 Consumers would be presented with simplified choices on
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how their data is used within the context of a single interaction, as opposed to opting in once
through privacy policies.186 Simplified choice would permit, for example, consumers to opt out
of “data tracking” across all websites.187 This approach would increase the level of privacy
protections granted to children currently, and redress intrusions by noncompliant companies
enjoined to comply with the COPPA rule. Moreover, it should have internal traction as it was
developed by the FTC.188
The FTC should adopt a more strategic approach to the imposition of civil penalties. The
current settlement approach ignores the financial incentives of noncompliant data collection. 189
The FTC should integrate the unjust gain and the number of individual violations, within any
determination of appropriate civil penalty amounts. A settlement approach that calculates the
gain from the ill-gotten data and factors in the number of potential violations would likely deter
future noncompliance. Otherwise, maximum deterrent effect can result from the imposition of
the maximum penalty $42,350, for every individual violation.190
The 170 million dollar YouTube settlement penalized approximately 4014 violations,
assuming the maximum amount was imposed. Over 2 billion logged-users access YouTube
every month, according to its own statistics; accordingly, a conservative estimate of violations
could be 50,000. Had the FTC imposed the statutory maximum for a mere 50,000 violations, the
resulting over 2 billion dollar fine would substantially reduce the financial benefits of
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noncompliance. Civil penalties in such amounts would assure that companies would never make
the decision that they gain more from violating COPPA and paying a civil penalty.
CONCLUSION

COPPA has made great strides since its enactment. The FTC has kept pace with
emerging technological trends and social concerns. However, enforcement remains a critical
issue. The concentration of enforcement power in the FTC often does little to ensure COPPA
compliance because their approach to settlement claims can compromise children’s privacy since
it preempts some intrusion upon seclusion claims. While private right of action might seem like
a good solution, the better solution is to require privacy by design requirements for companies
gathering children’s information and imposing greater penalties for violations.
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